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Abstract 
I examine two recent books by analytic philosophers that address the un-
derexplored topic of whether the meaning of life depends on the existence 
of a supernatural realm including God and a soul. John Cottingham’s On 
the Meaning of Life defends a supernaturalist conception of life’s meaning, 
whereas Kurt Baier’s Problems of Life and Death defends the opposite, natu-
ralist perspective. I show that their respective arguments are worth serious 
consideration, indicate some potential weaknesses in them, and suggest 
some other argumentative strategies that those interested in this fascinating 
topic might pursue elsewhere in more depth. 
 
 In this article I discuss two books by important analytic philosophers 
that explore the neglected topic of what makes a person’s life meaning-
ful. A central part of a book by Kurt Baier takes up this topic,1 and an 
entire book by John Cottingham does so.2 Although Baier’s book ex-
plores topics such as religion and morality apart from their bearing on 
life’s meaning, I discuss his book solely in light of what it says on this 
latter issue. I do this not only because this will facilitate comparison and 
contrast with Cottingham, but also because it is largely on meaning that 
Baier has something new to say (though I also recommend his discus-
sion of the deontological do/allow distinction).  
 Beyond subject matter, the two books share an additional com-
monality, namely, they both address an audience larger than just 
academic philosophers. Baier’s book is composed of Prometheus 
 
1 Baier 1997. 
2 Cottingham 2003. 
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Lectures that were delivered at the University of Buffalo, and is aimed 
at educated readers who might not know, say, the fundamentals of a 
humanist worldview. Cottingham’s book is part of Routledge’s Think-
ing in Action series, which aims to bring philosophy out of the acad-
emy and into the minds of the public. His book is elegantly written, 
with illuminating metaphors, striking images and moving turns of 
phrase. The two books cast a wide net, one that does not fail to snare 
specialists; a reader of this journal, too, will find something of use in 
these books despite their orientation toward a general audience.  
 The most striking dissimilarity between the two books concerns 
the theses defended. In value theory, Baier is as well known for his 
atheism as Cottingham is for his theism, and these views inform their 
respective accounts of meaning in life. Baier denies that God and a 
soul are necessary for meaning in life, whereas Cottingham affirms 
that they are. In what follows, I bring out this difference between the 
two authors and suggest avenues of research for those who wish to 
continue the debate between naturalism and supernaturalism.  
 
Baier’s book takes the same basic positions on life’s meaning first ex-
pressed nearly fifty years ago in his widely read inaugural lecture.3 
However, the book typically defends these positions with different 
arguments or in more depth, and it takes up some new issues unad-
dressed in previous work. For instance, the book works to articulate the 
sense of the question of life’s meaning. Baier is relatively unique among 
theorists for clearly distinguishing the question of what (if anything) 
would make a life meaningful from other normative questions such as: 
whether a life is happy or rewarding; what it is to act in a morally right 
way; whether a life is good; and whether a life is worth living. Too often, 
I think, people are wrongly inclined to identify the question of life’s 
meaning with one of these other questions. It is an open question 
whether a meaningful life is a happy one (sacrificing one’s free time to 
care for a sick relative), a moral one (abandoning others to realise one’s 
substantial artistic talents), a good one (a soldier grotesquely disfigured 
as a result of justly fighting in other-defence), or one worth living 
(perhaps the same case). Any relationship between meaning and these 
other evaluative categories is likely a substantive or argumentative 
matter, not a conceptual or definitional one. 
 
3 Baier 1957. 
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 If meaning is a logically distinct category, as Baier maintains, then 
one might like some elaboration on what it concerns. Baier admirably 
takes up this challenge. He notes that when we ask what (if anything) 
makes life meaningful we might be asking what could make human 
life in general (the race or species) meaningful, on the one hand, or we 
could be enquiring about what could make a particular human life 
meaningful, on the other. Baier rightly points out that it is consistent 
to hold one to be meaningful without holding the other to be, but that 
thinkers often maintain that the meaning of one has substantive impli-
cations for the meaning of the other. Baier usually addresses both 
simultaneously, but I here focus solely on the way he answers the 
question of what makes an individual’s life meaningful. Most of us 
care about whether the human species is significant, if at all, only 
insofar as it bears on the question of whether and how our own lives 
as individuals can be significant.  
 Baier draws an additional, more novel distinction between two 
different questions we might be asking with the question of life’s mean-
ing. He says that could be enquiring as to whether an individual’s life has 
a meaning or whether it has meaning. To ask whether a person’s existence 
has a meaning, for Baier, is to ask this: whether its essential character is 
so good as to largely make up for the bads suffered. Enquiring about a 
meaning, again, involves asking whether there is something substantially 
positive about what a human’s life basically amounts to. Baier says that 
to ask such a question permits of an explicit answer with respect to 
what the meaning is, with three traditional answers being: to play a role 
in God’s plan; to exhibit aesthetic qualities such as creativity, beauty, 
and narrative coherence in one’s life; and to act in this world so as to 
receive eternal bliss in the next one. 
 In contrast, Baier says that asking whether a life has meaning (but 
not a meaning) does not call for an answer specifying what the mean-
ing is, but rather one indicating ‘on account of what it is meaningful… 
what we want to know is not precisely what it means… what we want 
to know is its ground, what makes it meaningful’ (1997, 57). We seek 
the ground of meaning rather than its content in cases where some-
thing is meaningful to someone, i.e., in situations where a person 
perceives or judges something as meaningful.  
At times, something (for instance, a person’s relationship to someone, or 
her letter of condolence to us, or her embrace of a former lover) has 
meaning or is meaningful to or for us or something else. In such a case, a 
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person’s recognition of the meaningfulness of something in this sense 
does not depend on her knowing an answer to what that meaning is 
(Baier 1997, 57).  
Baier does not sketch standard answers to the question of in virtue of 
what life has meaning to someone, but merely presents his own. He 
maintains that a life has meaning (or we deem life to be meaningful) 
in virtue of its being valuable or significant, where a life is valuable 
insofar as it helps others and significant insofar as it influences them 
(not necessarily in desirable ways).  
 Although thought provoking, I find the distinction between having 
a meaning and having meaning obscure. I can grasp one way to draw a 
clear distinction with the terms that Baier is using. In normative 
ethical theory, one answers the question of what the moral thing to do 
is by claiming that it is, e.g., the act with the best consequences or one 
with the proper maxim, and in meta-ethical theory, one answers the 
question of in virtue of what the act is moral by saying that, e.g., an 
act’s morality is identical to a supernatural property such as the object 
of God’s will or to some natural property. This distinction in moral 
theory is familiar and readily grasped, but it does not parallel the 
distinction that Baier is trying to draw in meaning theory. When 
asking in virtue of what life has meaning, for Baier, we are not asking 
about which sort of metaphysical properties constitute the meaning; 
rather, we are still on the normative level in some way, one that 
supposedly does not involve asking for a specification of the meaning 
but rather its ‘ground.’  
 I submit that the most plausible understanding of Baier’s two 
questions about meaning ultimately collapses them into a single 
question. Asking whether life has a meaning is supposed to ask about 
the ‘essential character’ of a life. But the ‘essential character’ of an 
individual’s life, for Baier, need not be something invariable or univer-
sally shared. If exhibiting aesthetic qualities and acting so as to gain 
entrance to Heaven can count as the ‘essential character’ of a person’s 
life, then one would think that this could also be constituted by being 
valuable and significant (influencing others, particularly in helpful 
ways), ways that life may have meaning for Baier. Furthermore, asking 
whether life has a meaning is supposed to enquire about whether the 
essential character of an individual’s life is positive in a way that could 
mitigate the negative. But virtually whenever we ask whether our 
lives are meaningful we are seeking something positive, and so a quest 
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for the positive would reasonably characterise the question of whether 
life has meaning as well.  
 In light of these remarks, one sees that answers to one question are 
readily construed as answers to the other. For instance, when asking 
whether life has meaning and so seeking the ‘ground’ of what is (or 
should be) meaningful to people, one could conceivably answer that 
life has meaning in virtue of its aesthetic properties or its playing a 
role in God’s plan, alleged answers to the question of whether life has 
a meaning. And, conversely, the claim that a person has done a lot to 
help others in the course of her life seems to be a fair answer to the 
question of what the meaning of a life is, what its positive essential 
character is. 
 In contrast to Baier, I think that when people ask what, if anything, 
makes an individual’s life meaningful they are generally asking some-
thing to the effect of what it might be about life that is worthy of great 
pride or admiration, or how one can make one’s existence estimable 
apart from making it well off or fulfilling moral obligations.4 I think 
such a question is clearer than Baier’s formulations, and is closer to 
what most reflective people have in mind. Plus, such a question 
unifies Baier’s discussion, admitting of all the theoretical answers he 
canvasses: fulfilling God’s purpose, living an aesthetic life, living at a 
higher level in Heaven than one did on earth, having a major influence 
on others, and helping them.  
 We need not have a terribly specific understanding of the sense of 
the question of life’s meaning in order to have substantive, theoretical 
debate about the proper way to answer it (any more than we do in 
morality). We merely need to be able to distinguish the question of 
what constitutes meaningfulness from questions regarding happiness, 
rightness, beauty and other, logically distinct values. Therefore, in the 
rest of this article, I set aside Baier’s distinction between having mean-
ing and having a meaning, and instead rely on the reader’s intuitive 
sense of the question of life’s meaning (which, I hope, lines up with 
my proposal above). 
 
So far, I have discussed the way Baier deals with linguistic or conceptual 
analyses of the question of life’s meaning. Now I turn to his substantive 
answer to the question. Baier centrally maintains that life is meaningful 
 
4 Metz 2001; Metz 2002, 801–804. 
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insofar as it has a large impact on people’s lives (significance) or sub-
stantially helps them (value).5 This is obviously a naturalist conception, 
for a life can have an impact on others and benefit them independent of 
the existence of either God or a soul. Furthermore, it is an account 
denying that immortality (whether embodied or not) is necessary for 
meaning in life.  
 One way to question Baier’s account of meaning in life would be 
to point to additional naturalist sources of meaning, e.g., I and others 
such as Robert Nozick and Alan Gewirth maintain that one’s life can 
have meaning insofar as one makes a substantial scientific discovery or 
a beautiful and deep artwork,6 neither of which necessarily count as 
‘valuable’ or ‘significant’ as Baier uses these terms. However, I instead 
focus on the way a supernaturalist might respond to Baier. What I do 
first is question Baier’s arguments for thinking that no supernatural 
realm is necessary for meaning in life. Then, I bring out why Cotting-
ham would disagree with Baier. 
 Baier has two central arguments for thinking that death, an absence 
of an immortal soul, would not undercut meaning in life. The two 
arguments could equally entail that God’s non-existence would not 
undercut meaning, but, since Baier does not tend to mention God, I 
do not highlight this implication. First, then, Baier argues that when 
ascertaining whether a life is meaningful, it is appropriate to compare 
it to the average of its kind. Just as a good student is one whose work 
shows a greater comprehension than the average student’s, so a mean-
ingful life is one that is more valuable and significant than average. 
Since all lives end, the fact that one’s own life ends makes it no worse 
on average than others, and hence does not lessen its meaning.  
 One problem with this argument is that it seems to have an overly 
narrow notion of how to evaluate something’s worth. A particular 
childbirth might go a bit easier compared to the average childbirth, 
and hence on Baier’s view count as ‘good.’ However, since the labour 
still involves enormous amounts of pain, it surely counts as (intrinsi-
cally) ‘bad’ in a relevant and important respect. By analogy, even if 
 
5 Baier does not really answer his question of whether life has a meaning, merely 
sketching the way others have done so, and hence this is his answer to his question of 
whether life has meaning. 
6 Nozick 1981; Gewirth 1998; Metz 2003. 
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one’s life is significant and valuable relative to average lives, it and all 
other lives could be lacking meaning insofar as they come to an end.  
 In fairness, Baier acknowledges that it is possible to evaluate a life’s 
meaning apart from how much value and significance it has relative to 
average lives. He says that even if one life were much more valuable 
and significant than others, it would be an open question whether we 
should call this life ‘meaningful on balance.’ Here, Baier contends that 
the right standard to use is something like the maximum amount of 
value and significance a person’s life could have on earth. Those who 
were to come toward the highest end of the scale would have a mean-
ingful life on balance.  
 This account of meaning in life on the whole faces a dilemma. On 
the one hand, it is arbitrary as it stands. There seems to be no principled 
reason to pick a location (the earth) by which to evaluate a life. What if, 
in the future, human beings lived much longer, and hence helped more 
people for a longer time, by living in space? Such a possibility seems 
prima facie relevant. On the other hand, if Baier modifies his view to 
take into account such extraterrestrial possibilities, then it might follow 
that no human lives up to now have been meaningful. If we could in fact 
live much longer in space, then no earthly life would approximate the 
maximum amount of value and significance possible for us, and hence 
no earthly life would be meaningful on balance — something that 
seems implausible and, in any event, goes against the thrust of what 
Baier wants to claim. I submit that theorists should make the effort to 
sort out this puzzle in future work.  
 Baier’s second argument for thinking that immortality is not 
necessary for meaning starts from the point that, assuming we are in 
fact mortal, there is nothing we can do to change that fact. Underlying 
Baier’s discussion is the premise that if one cannot change a state of 
affairs, that state of affairs cannot affect the disvalue of one’s life. 
People often suggest something like this when they tell others not to 
get upset about aspects of life that they cannot control. Now, if a state 
of affairs can be bad for us only if we can change it in some way, and if 
we cannot change whether we die, then our deaths cannot be bad for 
us. Hence, again, for Baier death as such does not detract from the 
meaning of our lives.  
 However, counterexamples to the key premise abound. Here is 
one: supposing I cannot change the fact that my wife will die before 
me, her death will still be bad for me (and only a Zen master could 
think of claiming otherwise). Furthermore, imagine that we experi-
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enced a certain pleasure that we could not alter. It would surely be 
good for us despite our inability to control it; by analogy, something 
could be bad for us even though we could not alter it. On a more 
principled level, a state of affairs might have dis/value for a person if 
she is capable of non-volitional judgment-sensitive attitudes with 
respect to it. A person’s life is not merely the sum of actions, but also 
other reactions not involving the will that can be reasons-responsive. 
Even if one’s volitions cannot alter a certain state of affairs, it might 
nonetheless be good or bad for one so long as one can have certain 
conative, cognitive, affective, emotional or attitudinal responses to it. 
 Baier might be correct that death is compatible with meaning in life, 
but I have contended that his reasons for thinking so are unconvincing as 
they stand. I suspect that a stronger rationale for his view would point 
to instances of what he calls ‘value’ that seem to confer meaning on life 
even if we lack an immortal soul. As Anthony Flew remarked long ago, 
it would be odd for a doctor not to take an interest in curing people for 
the Keynesian reason that in the long run we are all dead.7 One might 
go farther, as Martha Nussbaum has in more recent work, and note that 
if we were immortal, then saving others would not be very important 
at all8; vulnerability seems necessary for help to matter. Insofar as we 
are convinced that helping others can be a central source of meaning in 
our lives, we should be disinclined to think that an immortal soul is 
necessary for such meaning. However, let us now see why Cottingham 
would reject this line of reasoning. 
 
Like Baier, Cottingham believes that acting morally, which of course 
includes helping others, is necessary for meaning in life. Unlike Baier, 
Cottingham denies that moral action is sufficient to make a life signifi-
cant. In Cottingham’s book I count two basic reasons for thinking that 
something more — something beyond — is also necessary for mean-
ing in life. 
 First, Cottingham maintains that success in one’s projects is neces-
sary for them to confer significance on one’s life. Meaning is particu-
larly upset by failure to achieve one’s moral ends, where such ends 
might include helping others or receiving what is deserved. Only an all-
powerful, all-good and all-knowing being could order the world so that, 
 
7 Flew 1966, 105. 
8 Nussbaum 1989. 
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presumably after our bodily deaths, our ends are realised or at least our 
losses are redeemed. With respect to Baier, I presume Cottingham 
would argue that, even if we occasionally succeed in helping others in 
this world, much more often our moral ends go unfulfilled, requiring 
another world for meaning to come from their fulfilment. 
 Second, Cottingham argues that moral principles must be 
grounded in an absolute order for our lives to obtain significance by 
acting in accordance with them. Neither nihilism, relativism nor even 
a species-wide morality would be enough to confer meaning, for 
Cottingham. Instead, only moral norms that are applicable to all 
agents in all places and at all times, and that hence must spring from a 
spiritual ground of the physical universe, would be enough to make 
our lives important when conforming to them. Regarding Baier, then, 
Cottingham would contend that the only sort of morality that matters 
is one that is God-based.  
 In addition to arguing that the existence of God and a soul partly 
constitutes what it is for a life essentially to be significant, Cottingham 
contends that belief in their existence, or rather acting as though they 
exist, is necessary for us to be able to obtain significance. As I under-
stand it, this latter claim is not about the content of a meaningful life, 
but rather about what to do so that one’s life is enriched with this 
content. Cottingham’s claim, in a nutshell, is that we will not be 
motivated to pursue challenging moral projects if we lack faith that 
we can eventually partake of a spiritual realm.  
(I)f the ultimate nature of reality contains no bias towards the good as 
opposed to the vicious, if there is nothing to support the hope that the 
good will ultimately triumph, if essentially we are on our own, with no 
particular reason to think that our pursuit of the good is any more than a 
temporary fragile disposition possessed by a percentage (perhaps a mi-
nority) of a certain class of anthropoids — then at the very least it is 
hard to see how we can achieve the necessary confidence and resolution 
to follow the path of goodness; and at worst the very idea that some lives 
can be more meaningful than others begins to seem a fantasy (Cotting-
ham 2003, 72).  
Paralleling the distinction between intrinsic value (goodness for its 
own sake) and extrinsic value (goodness as a means), I read Cotting-
ham as making two claims above: (1) that the existence of God and a 
soul partially constitute intrinsic meaning, i.e., that no life could be 
meaningful if neither existed; and (2) that acting as though they exist 
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is extrinsically meaningful, that is, cultivates the tenacity needed for a 
given person to act in accordance with God-based moral norms and 
thereby obtain intrinsic meaning. About a third of Cottingham’s book 
eloquently defends this second claim, articulating both the sort of 
religious way of life he believes is best able to promote meaning and 
the reasons for living religiously in the absence of compelling evi-
dence that a supernatural order exists.  
 Let us first see how to question Cottingham’s arguments with 
respect to the claim that intrinsic meaning in life is partially consti-
tuted by the existence of God and a soul. Recall that one argument is 
that since meaning in life requires action according to moral norms 
that apply to all rational beings, and since only God could ground such 
norms, God is necessary for meaning in life. One can reasonably 
doubt both premises. First, there are of course notorious problems 
with the divine command theory of morality, problems that Cotting-
ham acknowledges. He explicitly contends that moral rules must be 
backed up by reasons, which reasons are not merely a function of 
God’s will. The question, then, is: how else could God constitute 
moral norms if not by commands, preferences or other arbitrary 
features? Cottingham does not try to answer the question here, and, 
in the absence of an answer, one might think that a Rossian nonnatu-
ralism or a Kantian rationalism would best underwrite a strictly 
universal morality. Cottingham does argue for supernaturalism rela-
tive to competitors in later work,9 but, for the sake of focus on the 
present text, I move on to a second objection. 
 One can also question the premise that a strictly universal morality 
is necessary for meaning in life. While some such as Richard Taylor 
seem willing to deny that any morality at all is necessary for mean-
ing,10 I do not pursue that line here. I instead discuss whether a moral-
ity applicable to all human persons, but not necessarily persons as 
such, might not suffice. Suppose that there were a system of moral 
rules applicable to humans instructing them to help each other, but 
that this system applied to no other group of agents. My intuition is 
that acting according to such a merely comparatively universal system 
would confer meaning on our lives.  
 
9 Cottingham 2005. 
10 Taylor 1987. 
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 Furthermore, this intuition is buttressed in light of an analogy with 
other goods that are reasonably taken to constitute meaning. Making a 
great advance in science and creating a great artwork are plausibly 
deemed to be ways to confer significance on one’s life. But the laws of 
beauty, if there even are any, are applicable to at most our species; it is 
unlikely such laws would apply to agents with different sensibilities. In 
addition, scientific laws construed in realist terms are probably valid for 
at most us as a species, with no compelling reason to think that other 
species must conceptualise the world in fundamentally the same way. If 
art (the beautiful) and science (the true) are at most species-specific in 
their scope and yet are able to confer meaning on our lives, then, by 
analogy, it is plausible to think that morality (the good) is, too. And a 
species-specific morality need not be grounded by God; it could plausi-
bly obtain by virtue of a common evolutionary history,11 a common 
reference to a certain natural kind with the term ‘moral,’12 or a com-
mon ability to detect something akin to a secondary property.13 
 Let us now turn to Cottingham’s second argument for thinking 
that God and a soul in part make up (intrinsic) meaning in life. It says 
that since success is necessary for meaning, and since God and a soul 
are necessary for success, God and a soul are necessary for meaning. 
First off, one might doubt that the existence of God is needed to 
realise our ends. It is conceivable that an impersonal force, rather than 
a personal being, could arrange the world so that our goals are ulti-
mately achieved. For instance, if our goals are deserved, then some 
form of Karma would do the trick.  
 Now, since success is a relative rarity in this world, a life in another 
world is needed by which either God or Karma could help us along. 
Cottingham’s present rationale might therefore seem to support at 
least the claim that a soul (if not God) is necessary for meaning in life.  
 However, it is not clear that even this weaker entailment obtains. 
Having the prospect of an afterlife, whether immortal or not, is 
distinct from having a soul. If one is essentially a chain of memories or 
configuration of other mental states, then these could conceivably be 
transferred from one’s present body to another one after its death. 
There is no clear reason why one requires a soul in order to outlive 
 
11 E.g., Ruse 2002. 
12 E.g., Brink 1989. 
13 E.g., McDowell 1985. 
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one’s present body. Hence, even if we must exist after the death of our 
(present) bodies in order for our ends to be fulfilled to such a degree 
as to obtain meaning, it does not follow that we must have a soul.  
 A second objection to the present argument is that success is not 
necessary for meaning, only the right sort of effort is. Oddly, this is 
something that Cottingham himself in the end comes close to admit-
ting. He advocates ‘a certain mindset which will not judge the value of 
sticking to the side of goodness by reference to its success or failure 
measured in terms of outcome, but which generates the courage to 
endure, irradiated by hope’ (2003, 74) and elsewhere he speaks of 
‘turning away from evaluations based solely on external success’ 
(2003, 85). I worry that such pronouncements undercut one of 
Cottingham’s major rationales for thinking that God and a soul are 
necessary for meaning in life, namely, that ‘the hard truth is that our 
assessment of the value of a project — and this includes the sincere 
pursuit of morally worthy goods — is at least partly success-oriented: 
we require it not just to be undertaken in the right spirit, but to 
achieve something’ (2003, 66), which Cottingham maintains requires a 
supernatural realm. 
 The most natural ways to reconcile the apparent tension in the 
text, I think, would be to say either that success is merely a matter of 
cultivating the right sorts of internal dispositions, habits and will, 
apart from what these conditions might bring about in the external 
world, or that success includes an external element but that not much 
of it is necessary for meaning. The deep problem with these straight-
forward ways of resolving the tension, however, is that either sort of 
success (internal or minimal external) can be routinely achieved 
without the existence of God, a soul, or any sort of afterlife. 
 So far, I have questioned what I take to be Cottingham’s two 
central arguments for thinking that a relationship with a spiritual 
world is at least part of what it essentially is to live a meaningful life. 
The objections share a common feature: they both argue that aspects 
of a purely natural world could do the job for which God and a soul 
are thought to be needed. Both an objective morality and a sufficient 
realisation of moral ends seem possible in a merely physical world. In 
light of this problem, perhaps the supernaturalist about meaning 
should seek to ground meaning in spiritual qualities that most clearly 
cannot be manifest in the natural world, qualities such as atemporal-
ity, immutability, simplicity, and indivisibility. This strategy is rela-
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tively unexplored in the English speaking philosophical literature, but 
worth development.14  
 Now I turn to Cottingham’s argument for the claim that, in order 
to have the resolution required to carry out challenging moral pro-
jects and thereby obtain intrinsic meaning, we must act as though God 
and a soul exist and ideally believe in them as well. I suspect that this 
claim about extrinsic meaning depends on those about intrinsic 
meaning that were questioned above. If it is correct that neither moral 
rules nor moral success depend on the existence of God or a soul, 
then a religious lifestyle is unnecessary for moral motivation. Again, if 
God does not constitute moral rules the following of which confers 
meaning on life, and if neither God nor a soul is necessary for moral 
achievement of the sort that confers meaning, then a person need not 
believe in the existence of a supernatural realm, or act as though it 
exists, in order to be sufficiently determined in the face of moral 
difficulty. At most, she would have to be positively oriented toward 
the relevant natural properties that make moral norms and ends 
conforming to them possible.  
 
In this short article, I of course have come to no conclusion about 
how to resolve the dispute between naturalism and supernaturalism 
with respect to meaning in life. My goal has instead been to extract 
key arguments relevant to this debate from two books by powerful 
analytic thinkers, Kurt Baier and John Cottingham. I have worked to 
show that their arguments are worth serious consideration, to indicate 
some potential weaknesses in them, and to suggest some other argu-
mentative strategies that those interested in this fascinating but under-
explored topic might pursue elsewhere in more depth.15  
Thaddeus Metz 
Dept. of Philosophy 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Private Bag 3, WITS 2050, South Africa 
metzt@social.wits.ac.za 
 
14 For more on this strategy, see Metz 2000. 
15 I would like to thank Annette Baier, Kurt Baier and John Cottingham for read-
ing a draft of this article. I would also like to thank the University of Missouri 
Research Board for funding the research leave during which I wrote it.  
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